Weigley misuses the examples of John Pershing wearing down the German Army in 1918 and the U.S. This overthrow of the enemy in costly battles was the surest way to victory and the essential elements of Weigley’s tenets of attrition and annihilation remain as the main legacies and preferences of the American way of war. The strategy of annihilation relied on the creation of large masses of forces employing mass, concentration and firepower to use overwhelming power to destroy the enemy. From the Civil War through Vietnam, as America developed politically, economically, and militarily, its robust military capabilities allowed a transition from a strategy of attrition to one supporting a strategy of what Weigley calls annihilation. An example is George Washington using the interior of the Continent to draw in the British, away from their fleets and resupplies during the War of Independence. He contends that from the colonial era to the Civil War, while America developed as a new country, its military forces were relatively weak, so it engaged in wars of attrition. Weigley in The American Way of War, the pioneering work published in 1973, first described an American way of war, arguing it consisted of a unique American methodology: one of attrition and annihilation. Military historians and strategists have endeavored to define the American way of war, or rather define the characteristics of a tactical American way of battle. Rather, the American way of war is twofold: one is a tactical “way of battle” involving a style of warfare where distinct American attributes define the use of force the other is a strategic “way of war,” attuned to the whims of a four year political system, a process not always conducive to turning tactical victories into strategic success. Given this model, it appears that there is not a singular American way of war. The strategic way of war also includes alternative national strategies such as deterrence and a war of limited aims. When analyzed, this style of warfare reveals the American under-appreciation for historical lessons and cultural differences often leads to a disconnect between the peace and the military activity that preceded it.
This method of battle is highly dependent on technology and firepower, and has large-scale logistical requirements.įrom a strategic standpoint, the American way of war seeks swift military victory, independent of strategic policy success the desired political and military outcomes do not always align. The seemingly irresistible forces of well-trained professionals use speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. military using an aggressive style of force as to overwhelm and destroy enough of the enemy’s forces to acquire a decisive and quick victory with minimal casualties. The tactical way of battle has an adaptive U.S. Taking the differing perspectives in the American way of war historiography into account, one notes there is no authoritative listing of characteristics that define an American way of war however, extrapolating the commonalities, what emerges is a tactical way of battle and a strategic way of war. Within the historiography, authors have also tried to define the characteristics of the strategic American way of war, which includes advancing American national interests through various means, and how our culture and preparation for war actually shape the American strategy. Many writers have wrestled with this concept since, outlining the numerous characteristics of the American methodology, addressing the distinction between a way of war and a way of battle, and illustrating the advantages and disadvantages of these characteristics in major conflicts and small wars. Historian Russell Weigley first attempted to define the American approach to conflict in 1973. involvement in Afghanistan winding down, it is perhaps time to examine again the American way of war in order to evaluate its application for future conflicts. Strategists and military historians have written prolifically on the topic of an American way of war. A nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its laws made by cowards and its wars fought by fools.
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